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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, an unknown Twitter user created a fake account for
Anthony La Russa, the manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, at
1
twitter.com/TonyLaRussa. The user posted “tweets,” or updates, as La
2
Russa, a few of which were vulgar and Cardinals–related. The page
also included a photo of La Russa and only one line on the page
suggested it was fake, as the profile stated: “[b]io [p]arodies are fun for
3
everyone.” La Russa tried to contact the site to have the phony page
removed, but was unsuccessful, and filed the first suit of its kind against
4
Twitter. La Russa’s complaint alleged trademark infringement and
dilution, cybersquatting, and misappropriation, also known as a

1.
2.
3.
4.

Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC09488101 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 6, 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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violation of the right of publicity. Hours after the suit was filed, Twitter
6
removed the fake page, and the case was eventually settled.
Similarly, Ron Livingston, Office Space movie star, recently filed suit
after an anonymous Wikipedia editor repeatedly altered Livingston’s
7
Wikipedia entry so it stated that Livingston was homosexual. A fake
Facebook profile was also created for the actor, again alluding to
homosexuality; Livingston suspected the individual who edited the
8
Wikipedia page also created the profile. When the media first reported
this story, it was known the actor filed suit, but there was much debate
as to whom he named as the defendant, Wikipedia and Facebook or the
9
unknown individual responsible for posting the false information.
While the individual responsible for the post would normally be named
as a defendant for a right of publicity violation regardless of Twitter’s
liability, in this instance, that person was unknown; thus, making it
plausible that Livingston would seek restitution against Twitter.
This debate occurred because of the lack of uniformity between the
Circuit Courts as to how a particular provision, the intellectual property
exemption, in the Communications Decency Act (CDA) should be
interpreted. One circuit has held that the intellectual property
exemption under the CDA only includes federal intellectual property
rights, like copyright and trademark, while other circuits have held that
the intellectual property exemption under the CDA includes both

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. David Kravets, Office Space Actor Sues Anonymous Wikipedia Vandal, WIRED
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/livingston.
8. Id.
9. Tanya Roth, Ron Livingston Wikipedia Suit: Is Calling Someone Gay Defamation?,
FIND LAW (Dec. 9, 2009), http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2009/12/ron-livingstonwikipedia-suit-is-calling-someone-gay-defamation.html. When the story first emerged, two
websites, UPI and Techdirt, reported Livingston sued Wikipedia and Facebook, while three
different websites, PerezHilton, Wired, and Copyrights & Campaigns, stated that he sued the
individual responsible for the post. Id.; see also Perez Hilton, Office Space Star Sues Internet
Troll for Calling Him Gay!, PEREZ HILTON (Dec. 6, 2009), http://perezhilton.com/2009-1206-office-space-star-sues-internet-troll-for-calling-him-gay. Since these articles first emerged,
the complaint has become public and shows that Mr. Livingston actually filed suit against the
anonymous individual. Complaint, Coupleguys, Inc., v. Doe, No. BC427389 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
4, 2009). It is worth noting that this case was filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California. Since California is in the Ninth Circuit, it would follow the holding of Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007), which has construed the CDA to limit the
term intellectual property to federal intellectual property. Therefore, the right of publicity
would not fall under the exception provided in the CDA, and internet service providers
(ISPs), such as Wikipedia or Facebook, could not be held liable for the violation of a person’s
right of publicity. Therefore, because of the current Ninth Circuit stance, the case was filed
against John Doe, rather than against Wikipedia or Facebook.
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federal intellectual property rights and state intellectual property rights,
like the right of publicity.
A resolution of this jurisdictional split is important. If the
intellectual property exemption under the CDA includes only federal
intellectual property rights, then an individual whose right of publicity
has been violated by another party posting on a website, such as Twitter,
Facebook, or Wikipedia, may only seek restitution against the
individual who posted the content. On the other hand, if the intellectual
property exemption under the CDA includes both federal intellectual
property rights and state intellectual property rights, then an individual
whose right of publicity has been violated by another party posting on a
website, such as Twitter, Facebook, or Wikipedia, may seek restitution
against both the individual who posted the content and the internet
service provider (ISP), Twitter, Facebook, or Wikipedia.
This Comment will demonstrate that a state law right of publicity
claim should be included in the intellectual property exception of the
CDA, and thus, individuals like Tony La Russa and Ron Livingston
should be able to seek redress for violations of their rights of publicity
from ISPs, like Facebook, Twitter, and Wikipedia. Part II will explain
the development of the right of publicity. Part III will detail the
legislative history of the Communications Decency Act. Part IV will
propose two possible reasons why the CDA carved out an exception for
intellectual property rights. Part V will contain an examination of the
case law that has caused the jurisdictional split as to whether the right of
privacy and other similar state intellectual property rights fall under the
intellectual property exception of the CDA. Finally, Part VI will
conclude by demonstrating that according to the plain language of the
statute and the proposed purposes, the right of publicity should be
included in the intellectual property exemption of the CDA.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY

The right of publicity, a state law claim, is a person’s legal right to
10
control the exploitation of their name and likeness.
The right
“prevents unjust enrichment by providing a remedy against exploitation
of the goodwill and reputation that a person develops in his name or
11
likeness through the investment of time, effort, and money.” As the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, the right
“appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using
10. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 263 (2003).
11. Bi-Rite Enter., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity
12
for the purpose of trade.”
The notion of the right of publicity arose in the American legal
13
community as a result of three pivotal law review articles. It was not
until sixty-three years after the publication of these articles, in 1953, that
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term
14
“right of publicity.”
The Supreme Court recognized the right of
publicity in 1977, as it noted the following different motivations behind
the right of privacy and the right of publicity: economic interests drive
the right of publicity, while privacy protections drive the right of
15
privacy.
Cases involving the right of publicity typically involve a celebrity
plaintiff. However, courts are split as to whether being a celebrity is a
prerequisite to bringing a right of publicity claim. Some courts have
16
found right of publicity is restricted to celebrities. On the other hand,
the majority of courts have found that non-celebrities are allowed to
recover for a violation of their right of publicity if there is proof that the
17
individual’s identity possesses some economic value. Therefore, for
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
13. Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *3 (S.D.W.Va.
Feb. 14, 2008). The right to privacy, from which the right of publicity seemingly grew out of,
first received widespread recognition as a result of Samuel Warren and Louise Brandeis’s
article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article states, “the right to life
has come to mean the right to enjoy life, — the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures
the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every
from of possession—intangible, as well as tangible [emphasis added].” Id. (emphasis added).
Though the right of publicity was not specifically mentioned in this article, it set the stage for
Dean Prosser to later break the right of privacy into four distinct torts. The four torts
comprising the right of privacy, as suggested by Prosser in his article, Privacy, include the
following: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, (2) publication of private facts, (3) false
light, and (4) misappropriation of one’s name or likeness. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). The fourth privacy tort was further defined by Prosser as the
“exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff’s identity,” or more commonly known today as the
right of publicity. Id. at 401. Finally, in Melville Nimmer’s seminal article, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954), he attempted to define the parameters of
the right of publicity, stating that the right should be available to everyone, not just limited to
celebrities, and should be recognized as a property right, not a personal right, so it may be
assigned and subsequently enforced by the assignees.
14. Haelan Labs. Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
15. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1983); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698
F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.
1984); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982);
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 10, at 268.
17. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 953 (6th Cir. 2003); see Tellado v.
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one to invoke the right of publicity, the individual must have attained
some degree of “celebrity status,” meaning their identity has an
economic value that needs protection.
The right has expanded and evolved over time into one the courts
18
typically classify as an intellectual property right. The right originated
from state statutes and common law, and there is no federal
19
equivalent. Currently, nineteen states have statutes that define a right
of publicity and twenty-eight others recognize a common law right of
20
publicity. The Restatement outlines the elements of the prima facie
case, which require the plaintiff to establish:
1. Validity. Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or
persona of a human being; and
2. Infringement
(A) Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of
identity or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable
from defendant’s use; and
(B) Defendant’s use is likely to cause damage to the
commercial
21
value of that persona.
While these elements are typical of what one would need to prove for a
successful right of publicity claim, it should be noted that the elements
might vary from state to state.

Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986); Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 459 N.E. 2d 507,
509 (Ohio 1984); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75 (N.J. 1967); J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4.3 (2d ed. 2003); SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 10, at 268; see also Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I.
1988). In 1987, Life magazine tried to sell a famous picture of a sailor, the plaintiff, kissing a
nurse on V-J Day for $1600 each. Id. at 968. The sailor in the picture brought an action
against the magazine for “misappropriation of likeness.” Id. The court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because of the commercial nature of
the sale. Id. at 973. Commentary on this case suggests that the holding demonstrated the
court’s emphasis on the commercial use of one’s name or likeness, regardless of whether the
individual was celebrity. See id. However, it can be argued the sailor had achieved some
level of celebrity status, as the initial publication of the picture occurred on August 27, 1945,
and by the time the suit was brought, the image of the sailor in the photograph was very “well
known.” Id. at 968.
18. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1.
19. Id. § 6:135.
20. Statutes, RIGHTOFPUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Sept.
24, 2010).
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
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II. THE CDA AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress passed the CDA as Title V of the Telecommunications Act
22
of 1996.
The CDA was primarily passed to protect minors from
exposure to obscene and indecent material on the Internet, as the
legislative body was “troubled by an increasing number of published
reports of inappropriate uses of telecommunications technologies to
transmit pornography, engage children in inappropriate adult contact,
terrorize computer network users through ‘electronic stalking’ and seize
23
personal information.”
However, the CDA provisions regulating
pornographic content were subsequently struck down as
unconstitutional.
The second reason the CDA was passed, as emphasized by both the
House and Senate, was to overrule Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy
Services, which treated ISPs as publishers or speakers of the content
24
posted on their sites.
In Stratton Oakmont, the defendant hosted
25
“Money Talk,” the country’s top financial message board at that time.
An anonymous user posted statements on “Money Talk” alleging
criminal and fraudulent behavior by Stratton Oakmont, Inc. and
26
Stratton’s president, Daniel Porush. Originally, Prodigy advertised it
“exercised editorial control” over the message board, but by the time
27
the defamatory comments were posted, Prodigy changed its policies.
Regardless, Stratton claimed that Prodigy edited the contents on its
message boards in a way that rendered the company a publisher for
28
liability purposes. The court determined Prodigy exercised sufficient
editorial control over the message board to qualify as a publisher. As a
result, this decision imposed the same responsibilities on ISPs as
newspapers, making them liable for the statements posted on their
29
message board.
The court found that “[b]y actively utilizing
technology and manpower to delete notes from its computer bulletin
boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste,’ for example,
P[rodigy] is clearly making decisions as to content . . . and such decisions
constitute[d] editorial control,” and thus, Prodigy was operating as a

22. 47 U.S.C § 230 (1996).
23. See S. REP. NO. 104–23, at 59 (1995).
24. See H.R REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996)(Conf. Rep.).
25. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y.Sup.
May 24, 1995).
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2–3.
28. Id. at *3.
29. Id. at *4.
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30

publisher.
At the same time, while drafting the CDA, Congress was also
31
concerned with ensuring the continued development of the Internet.
The legislative body recognized the speed at which information could be
distributed and the near impossibility of regulating information content.
It also saw a great opportunity for greater “availability of educational
32
and informational resources.” Congress believed the Internet could
provide “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
33
intellectual activity.” Accordingly, when writing the statute, Congress
aimed “to promote the continued development of the Internet” and
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” that the Internet
34
created.
The legislative history of the CDA shows that Congress thought
ISPs were the best entities to manage content on the Internet and
35
specifically, their websites.
As a policy decision, Congress chose,
“[w]hether wisely or not . . . to effectively immunize providers of
30. Id.
31. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). While various policy options were available to
Congress, it chose to “promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media” and “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market” for such service, largely “unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) , (2). In § 230(a), Congress explicitly listed the five
reasons why it granted immunity to ISPs. They are as follows:
“(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability
of educational and informational resources to our citizens. (2) These services offer
users
a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential
for even greater control in the future as technology develops. (3) The Internet and
other
interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political disclosure,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity. (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to
the
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulations. (5) Increasingly
Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational,
cultural,
and entertainment services.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(a).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
35. Adam M. Greenfield, Despite a Perfect 10, What Newspapers Should Know About
Immunity (And Liability) for Online Commenting, 4 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 453, 461–
62 (2008).
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interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to
36
material disseminated by them but created by others.” Thus, Congress
decided not to treat ISPs in the same manner as traditional publishers,
such as newspapers, magazines, television, or radio stations; all of which
may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory
material written or prepared by others. Further, in its legislative
decision-making, Congress opted not to hold ISPs liable for their failure
to edit, withhold, or restrict access to offensive material distributed
through their websites.
Congress’s decision to immunize ISPs and their objection to Stratton
Oakmont is most clearly seen in § 230(c) of the CDA, the “Good
Samaritan” subsection. This subsection states “[n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
37
provider.” The term “information content provider” is defined as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
38
or development of information provided through the Internet.”
Therefore, under the “Good Samaritan” provision, ISPs such as
Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, etc., are not treated as publishers of
information posted on their sites by their members, the information
content providers.
However, the CDA goes on to state, “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
39
property,” but does not define “intellectual property” anywhere in the
Act. Federal intellectual property law claims for infringement of
copyrights, trademarks, and patents are clearly exempted from this
section. However, Congress made no mention in the legislative history
as to whether it intended to view state law claims, like the right of
40
publicity, as intellectual property claims or tort claims. One court has
concluded that the CDA only grants immunity for ISPs for tort-based
41
negligence claims arising from the acts of their users. According to the
36. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330
(4th Cir. 1997).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
40. Ian C. Ballon, The Good Samaritan Exemption and the CDA, 978 PLI/ PAT 515,
564 (2009).
41. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Gucci
brought a suit against Mindspring, an ISP for trademark infringement. Id. at 411. Mindspring
argued that the CDA precluded the company from liability for the information posted on
their own website. Id. The court distinguished this case from others that successfully invoked
§ 230 as a defense because those cases were based in tort law. Id. at 415. Therefore, the court
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Gucci court, the Act does not grant immunity for any state law
intellectual property claims.
III. PURPOSE OF THE CDA
In the congressional findings, Congress noted that the Internet offers
“unique opportunities for cultural development” and has been
increasingly relied on by Americans for “a variety of political,
42
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”
While Congress
decided it was beneficial for the development of the Internet to
immunize ISPs from the liabilities imposed on publishers, it specifically
removed ISPs’ protection for the violation of “any law pertaining to
43
intellectual property.” But why did this legislative body carve out an
intellectual property exemption to the general rule? Unfortunately, this
question cannot be answered by looking at the legislative history of the
Act.
The issue of ISP liability was convoluted and uncertain at the time
Congress passed the CDA. In 1991, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,
44
CompuServe hosted an online news forum. The contents of the forum
were “manage[d], review[ed], create[d], delete[d], edit[ed], and
45
otherwise controll[ed]” by an independent party.
One particular
forum, Rumorville USA, a daily newsletter, published content about a
46
competing online newsletter developed by Cubby. Cubby asserted that
the contents were defamatory, and while CompuServe did not disagree,
it argued it should not be held liable because it was only a distributor of
that information and did not know and had no reason to know of the
47
posting.
The court agreed with CompuServe and held that
CompuServe was a distributor rather than a publisher of the content,
and thus, it should only be held liable for defamation if it knew or had
48
reason to know of the defamatory nature of the statements. Through
this finding, the court seemingly held that ISPs were subject to
traditional defamation law for content posted on their websites.
Stratton Oakmont, as discussed above, pointed out that if
found that the CDA did not give Mindspring immunity from Gucci’s trademark claim
because the claim was rooted in intellectual property. Id.; see also Universal Commc’n Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (5).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
44. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 141.
48. Id.
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distributors of information knew, or should have known, about the
49
The court
defamatory statements, they would be held liable.
distinguished this case from Cubby as it found that ISPs were no longer
merely distributors of information when they exercised editorial control,
50
and as a result should be treated as the publisher of the information.
In its legislative history, Congress specifically mentioned it sought to
overturn Stratton Oakmont. In doing so, it recognized that Cubby and
Stratton Oakmont created a seemingly impossible situation for ISPs. If
ISPs knew, or should have known, content on their sites was defamatory
they would be held liable, and if they edited their sites for such content
and missed certain postings or statements, they would still be considered
publishers of that information and held liable. The CDA was
Congress’s response to dealing with this dilemma.
One possible explanation why Congress may have created the
intellectual property exemption under the CDA was to address issues of
defamation on the Internet, but leave intellectual property rights alone.
Congress may have recognized that copyrights and trademarks had
established precedent in the area of secondary liability. Under these
secondary liability doctrines, such as contributory liability and vicarious
liability for copyright law, ISPs could be held liable for violations posted
on their sites. By leaving intellectual property exempted from the
provisions of the CDA, Congress was creating law consistent with the
established precedent by still holding ISPs liable for intellectual
property violations posted on their sites. Thus, while ISPs needed
immunity stemming from defamatory comments posted on their
websites, there was no need to change the already established
intellectual property laws.
Another possible reason Congress provided the intellectual property
exception might have been to continue to protect creators of intellectual
property. The purpose behind intellectual property rights is primarily
economic. The traditional view of intellectual property rights is “as
instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on
individuals solely for the purpose of contributing to the greater public
51
good.” These rights provide financial incentives to individuals who
create intellectual property.
49. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y.Sup.
May 24, 1995).
50. Id. at *4.
51. Barton, J., Alexander D., Correa, C., Mashelkar, R., Samuels, G., Thomas, S. et al.
(2002). IntegratingIntellectual Property Rights and Development Policy. Resource document.
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf.
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Congress may have destroyed this immunity in order to,
metaphorically speaking, keep from pulling out the rug on those that
own intellectual property rights. In order for these economic gains to be
felt by the creators and owners of intellectual property rights, these
rights need to be enforced; if there is no longer an economic gain, this
may have a very serious chilling effect on the creation of intellectual
property. If ISPs are immune from liability, the likelihood of them
monitoring for violations of intellectual property rights seems slim to
none. By taking away their immunity, ISPs have an incentive to closely
monitor for these offenses. While Congress may not have had the same
concern for individuals that are defamed, by including the intellectual
property exemption in the CDA, the legislative body seemed to
recognize the importance of preserving the already established
intellectual property rights and the financial incentives they create.
IV. EXAMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT AS TO WHETHER §
230(E)(2) OF THE CDA INCLUDES BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Jurisdictions are split as to whether “intellectual property” under §
230 includes just federal intellectual property law, or is broad enough to
include both state and federal intellectual property law. The Ninth
Circuit emphasized the lack of uniformity between state intellectual
property laws and determined the CDA only includes federal
52
Conversely, district courts in New
intellectual property laws.
Hampshire and southern New York sharply criticized this approach and
focused on the language of the Act to determine whether § 230(e)(2)
53
includes both state and federal intellectual property law.
This is
significant because in situations where courts have determined the CDA
only includes federal intellectual property rights, like the Ninth Circuit,
ISPs cannot be held liable if users of their website violate another
person’s right of publicity. In contrast, in situations where courts have
determined the CDA includes both state and federal intellectual
property claims, like the district courts in New Hampshire and southern
New York, ISPs are no longer immune from right of publicity claims
and may be held liable.

52. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007).
53. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299–300 (D.N.H. 2008);
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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A. The Argument that “Intellectual Property” Under § 230 (e)(2) of the
CDA Only Includes Federal Intellectual Property Law
In the 2007 Ninth Circuit Case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, the
plaintiff, Perfect 10, published an adult entertainment magazine and was
54
the owner of the subscription website perfect10.com.
The website
featured images of models, created by the company, that were only
55
accessible to registered, paying members. Many of the models signed
56
releases assigning their rights of publicity to Perfect 10. Additionally,
the company held copyrights for the images and owned several related
57
The plaintiffs asserted that the
trademarks and service marks.
defendants violated copyright, trademark, state law claims of violation
of the right of publicity, unfair competition, and false and misleading
advertising laws by providing services to websites that posted images
58
stolen from Perfect 10’s magazine and website.
The court found that the term “intellectual property” was limited to
59
“federal intellectual property.” The court noted that state intellectual
property laws, such as the right of publicity, are not consistent with
60
federal intellectual property laws because of their lack of uniformity.
It further stated:
Because material on a website may be viewed across the
Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time, permitting the
reach of any particular state’s definition of intellectual property
to
dictate the contours of this federal immunity would be contrary
to
Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of the
61
Internet from the various state–law regimes.
The court seemingly concluded that because of the lack of uniformity
between states and lack of clarification of the term “intellectual
property” in the CDA, the only reasonable way to construe the
language of § 230 would be to limit intellectual property to federal
62
intellectual property. Therefore, it found the defendants were eligible
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
See id.
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for CDA immunity for the state right of publicity claim brought by
63
Perfect 10.
B. “Intellectual Property” Under § 230 (e)(2) of the CDA Includes Both
State and Federal Intellectual Property Law
In the 2008 case, Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., a New
Hampshire district court expressly declined to follow Perfect 10 and
64
adopted dicta from the First Circuit holding that state publicity claims
65
were not preempted by § 230. The defendant corporation operated a
number of “web communities” where users met each other through
66
online personal advertisements.
A false profile was created for a
member that contained a variety of information on her sexual
proclivities, and other information such as birth date, height, build, hair
and eye color, and submitted a nude photograph, purportedly of
67
herself. The plaintiff did not learn of the profile until more than a year
68
after its creation.
After being contacted, the defendants said they
would take down the profile; but instead of taking it down, they put up
language stating that the profile had been removed. This language
69
made no indication that the profile was false to begin with. For several
months after the initial complaint, the profile showed up on other
70
similar websites operated by the defendants. To make matters worse,
the profile appeared as advertisements on third party websites,
71
including sexually related sites.
The plaintiff brought eight counts
72
against the defendants, including a right of publicity claim.
The court stated the analysis of the statute should begin with its
language, and the language did not suggest intellectual property was to
be limited to federal intellectual property. It criticized the Ninth
Circuit’s lack of statutory interpretation, in particular, its disregard for
the presence of the term “any” and the absence of the term “federal” in
73
the statute. The court noted, “[i]t is well settled that where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1119.
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 300.
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another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
did so intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
74
exclusion.” The court also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit failed to
look at the rest of § 230, as the statute contains other provisions that
75
specifically identify whether federal or state law applies. Finally, the
court found that Perfect 10 failed to address any particular instances
where the state’s definition of intellectual property went beyond the
scope of federal law, or how state intellectual property law varied so
76
drastically between states, thus making this argument “shaky at best.”
The court found the facts presented were sufficient to state a claim for
77
Therefore, the
infringement of the plaintiff’s right to publicity.
defendants could still be liable for the fake profile posted on their
website.
Likewise, in 2009, in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist,
Inc., the Southern District of New York rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
holding and found the CDA did not bar the plaintiff’s New York state
78
law copyright claims. The defendant operated a website that provided
79
an index of songs available on third-party websites. Users could create
playlists of the songs on the website, upload the songs to their profiles
on social networking sites, or download the songs from the third-party
80
websites. The plaintiffs owned the copyrights to many of the songs the
81
The songs were posted without the
defendants provided links to.
plaintiff’s permission, and thus, the court found copyright
82
infringement.
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s state common law
copyright infringement claims alleging the claims were barred by the
83
CDA. The court reasoned the same way as Friendfinder, and found

74. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 173 (2001)).
75. Id. at 299-300.
76. Id. at 301.
77. Id. at 306.
78. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). Today, federal copyright law expressly preempts most state copyright laws; yet before
1972, sound recordings were protected only under state copyright law. The plaintiff in this
case was suing to enforce those state rights. Eric Goldman, 230 Doesn’t Preempt State IP
Claims—Atlantic Records v. Project Playlist, TECHNOLOGY & MARKET LAW BLOG (Apr.
2009) http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/04/230_doesnt_pree.htm.
79. Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
80. Id. at 692–693.
81. Id. at 693.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 698.

2011]

TWITTER OR TWEETER

251
84

that “any law” was not just limited to federal law. Additionally, the
court noted four different places in § 230(e) where Congress specified
whether it intended local, state, or federal law to apply and pointed out
85
the absence of such language in this instance. The court found this
indicated that “any law” included both state and federal law, as
86
Congress clearly knew how to make the distinction but chose not to.
The court also struck down the defendant’s argument that all state laws
87
relating to intellectual property are preempted by § 230(e)(2), because
88
those laws are inconsistent with the CDA. It found § 230(e) provided
states with the authority to enforce any state law consistent with the
89
CDA. Since the defendant did not demonstrate the state law claims
90
were inconsistent, its argument could not be upheld. The court held
the plain language of the CDA made it clear that §230 (e)(2) does not
91
provide immunity for either state or federal intellectual property law.
Therefore, the court concluded that the CDA did not provide immunity
for federal or state intellectual property claims and the defendant’s
92
motion to dismiss was denied.
V. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF §
230(E)(2) DEMONSTRATE THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY SHOULD FALL
UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCEPTION OF THE CDA
Courts should follow Friendfinder and Atlantic Recording Corp. and
treat the right of publicity as an intellectual property right under § 230
of the CDA. The language of the statute states, “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
93
intellectual property.” The plain language of the Act, along with the
proposed purpose of the Act, speaks to the inclusiveness of state
intellectual property rights under § 230(e)(2).
Here, both New York and New Hampshire District Courts have
clearly pointed out that the statute is unambiguous. First, a statute is
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any
State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
47 U.S.C. § 230 (e)(3) (2006).
88. Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 704.
92. Id.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (emphasis added).
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ambiguous if a reasonably well-informed person can interpret it in more
94
than one way. And the term “any” allows for a broad interpretation of
95
the statute and can be defined as “every.” As a result, any person that
is reasonably well-informed of the definition of the word “any” could
not interpret the statute in more than one way; there is no ambiguity in
this term, and therefore, should included both federal and state law.
Second, as courts have pointed out, Congress uses the words local, state,
and/or federal in subsection (e), to limit the application of other
subsections of the CDA, but fails to use any limiting term in subsection
(e)(2). Third, § 230 allows for state laws consistent with the CDA, and
based on the purpose of the Act, as described in § 230(a), there is no
indication that a state right of publicity claim would be inconsistent with
this purpose. In conclusion, since the plain meaning of the word “any”
is broad and inclusive of all types of law, Congress failed to use a
limiting word such as local, state, or federal in the subsection, and a
state law right of publicity is not indicative of any inconsistencies with
the CDA, the plain meaning of the statute clearly shows a state law right
of publicity claim should be included under the intellectual property
exemption of § 230(e)(2).
Under the plain meaning rule, if “the intention of the legislature is
so apparent from the face of the statute that there can be no question as
96
to its meaning, there is no room for construction.” As both the New
York and New Hampshire District Courts made clear, convincing
arguments that the Act is unambiguous and because of the plain
meaning, the canons of construction analysis need not go any further.
However, if this analysis is not fully convincing, in addition to the
plain language of the statute, the proposed purpose of the statute is
indicative that Congress meant for the intellectual property exemption
to include both state and federal laws. Economic interests like all other
intellectual property rights; drive the right of publicity the economic
interest being the commercial value attributed to a person’s identity. If
ISPs are immune from liability, they are probably not going to monitor
their websites for violations of an individual’s right of publicity.
However, to ensure that this right is fully enforced, and that individuals
who have put the time, effort, and money into ensuring their goodwill
and reputation are being adequately compensated for this undertaking,
94. Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2009).
95. MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010) (search for definition of “any”).
96. Application of Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (quoting 2 Sutherland,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4702 (3d ed. 1943)).
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state intellectual property rights should be included in the intellectual
property exception of the CDA.
Further, as explained in the proposed purpose of the CDA,
Congress seemingly realized the impossible situations ISPs, especially
the ISPs with numerous members, were facing in managing the
defamatory statements posted on their websites in light of the new case
law, and sought to reconcile the situation. At the same time, the
legislative body realized that intellectual property laws already had
secondary liability precedent in place that could be easily translated to
the Internet context.
Additionally, if the intellectual property
exemption did not exist, intellectual property rights could be violated on
the Internet without seemingly any recourse for the owners of those
rights, especially if violators who created those postings could not be
found. The intellectual property exception has created reasons for ISPs
to monitor their sites for these types of violations and has preempted a
possible chilling effect that could have occurred if the owners of these
rights were to no longer receive the financial benefit of their labors.
In determining whether the right of publicity falls under the
proposed purposes of the intellectual property exception, it must be
determined whether the right more closely parallels that of a privacy
tort, like defamation, or an intellectual property right.
First, the right of publicity and the right privacy protect
fundamentally different underlying interests. Under the right of
publicity, the owner of the right possesses a commercial interest, like the
owners of intellectual property rights. In contrast, one does not have
this same commercial interest under privacy rights. An emphasis on the
loss of commercial value is very different than an emphasis on the
97
invasion of an individual’s autonomy or integrity.
Second, the remedies afforded are different to those who have had
their right of publicity violated as opposed to having their privacy rights
violated. Typically, when there is a violation of property rights, like
intellectual property rights, the remedy afforded is the right to exclude,
or the issuing of an injunction against the individual violating the
98
property right. On the other hand, when there is a violation of a
97. Robert T. Thompson, Image As Personal Property: How Privacy Law Has
Influenced the Right of Publicity, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 155, 164 (2009).
98. Occasionally, a party will seek monetary damages for a violation of the right of
publicity. However, the damages one would seek under the right of privacy differ from the
damages one would seek under the right of publicity. The Eleventh Circuit explains:
“The appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy rights, centers on
damage
to human dignity. Damages are usually measured by ‘mental distress’—some bruising
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privacy tort, like defamation, the remedy afforded is typically damages,
not an injunction. Since individuals typically sue for an injunction when
their right of publicity has been violated, the right of publicity is more
99
closely aligned with intellectual property rights.
Finally, individuals who have attained the status necessary to invoke
the right of publicity also gain other privileges. For example, the right
100
of publicity is assignable during the individual’s life.
Courts have
found that without this characteristic, full commercial exploitation of
101
one’s name and likeness would be practically impossible.
The right
can also be bequeathed, enforced by the assignee, and licensed, while
102
privacy torts cannot be assigned in any capacity or inherited.
Therefore, for these reasons, the right of publicity is more closely
aligned with intellectual property rights, like copyrights and trademarks,
than with tort rights, such as defamation. As a result, in addition to the
plain language of the statute, the proposed purposes of the statute also
indicate that the right of publicity should fall under § 203(e)(2) of the
CDA.
CONCLUSION
As social networking sites continue to grow in size, number, and
popularity, inevitably so too will violations of an individual’s right of
publicity. Without a resolution as to whether state law intellectual
property claims, such as the right of publicity, are to be included under
the intellectual property exemption of § 230(e)(2) of the CDA,
confusion will continue to arise, like in the Livingston case, as to
whether a violated individual can seek restitution against the ISP or is
limited to seeking recourse from the individual responsible for the
of
the human psyche. On the other hand, the right of publicity relates to commercial
damage
to the business value of human identity. Put simplistically, while infringement of the
right
of publicity looks to an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of appropriation privacy
looks to an injury to the psyche.”
Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, one would be
compensated for different injuries under each of these rights, again not making them
equivalent.
99. See id.
100. Haelan Labs., Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
101. Id.
102. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods. Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982).
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posting.
Courts should follow Friendfinder and Atlantic Recording Corp. and
find that intellectual property under § 230(e)(2) of the CDA includes
both federal and state intellectual property rights. The plain language
indicates Congress’s intent to include any intellectual property rights.
Additionally, if the efforts of intellectual property creators are going to
be protected, their rights need to be enforced. By making ISPs
potentially liable for infringement of these rights, owners of intellectual
property rights will get the protection they deserve. Further, the right of
publicity has the same fundamental underlying interest, typically
invokes the same remedies, and gives the owner the same privileges,
such as assignably and inheritability, as other intellectual property
rights. These factors demonstrate that the right of publicity more
closely reflects an intellectual property right, rather than a privacy tort.
Therefore, the right of publicity should be included in the intellectual
property exemption of § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, and ISPs should be held
liable if their users post contents on their websites that violate this right.
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